Poonam Sharma
Bangladesh’s political turbulence following the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has exposed more than just a leadership vacuum. It has revealed deep institutional fractures, personal rivalries, and a possible consolidation of power under interim leader Muhammad Yunus. At the heart of this storm lies President Mohammed Shahabuddin, who has now openly accused the Yunus-led interim regime of sidelining and humiliating him.
The question many observers are now asking is simple yet explosive: Did Yunus deliberately plot to weaken, isolate, and possibly unseat the President to tighten his own grip on power?
A President Under Pressure
Shahabuddin’s recent revelations paint a troubling picture. He claims he was placed under virtual house arrest, denied permission to travel abroad for medical treatment, and repeatedly targeted for removal from office. These are not minor grievances; they are allegations that strike at the core of constitutional governance.
Under normal democratic practice, even interim governments operate within institutional boundaries. The presidency in Bangladesh, though largely ceremonial, carries constitutional authority and symbolic legitimacy. If Shahabuddin’s claims are accurate, then the Yunus administration did more than just sideline him — it attempted to marginalize a constitutional office for political convenience.
The most glaring example of this tension is the controversy surrounding Sheikh Hasina’s resignation letter. Shahabuddin initially stated that he had received it. Later, he said he had only heard about the resignation and never saw the actual document. This reversal triggered protests and raised suspicions about the legitimacy of the transition that brought Yunus to power.
It is difficult to ignore how this confusion ultimately benefited the interim regime. The absence of a documented resignation weakened constitutional clarity — but strengthened the executive maneuvering space of Yunus.
Strategic Isolation or Political Necessity?
Supporters of Yunus argue that extraordinary times required extraordinary measures. Bangladesh was reeling from protests, violence, and administrative breakdown. Swift consolidation of authority, they claim, was essential to prevent chaos.
However, critics point to a pattern that suggests something more calculated.
Shahabuddin alleges he was excluded from key decisions, including a sensitive trade agreement with the United States. Constitutionally, major state agreements are expected to be communicated to the President. Bypassing that process raises questions about transparency and intent.
Moreover, preventing a sitting President from traveling for medical treatment — especially after bypass surgery — signals more than bureaucratic friction. It indicates control. Political control.
If Yunus truly sought institutional stability, why isolate the very office meant to symbolize continuity?
The Islamist Equation
The situation becomes more complex when viewed against Yunus’s alleged engagement with Islamist forces. Parties such as Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and groups like Hefazat-e-Islam regained space during the interim period. The lifting of bans and release of jailed Islamist leaders altered Bangladesh’s political balance.
Critics argue that this recalibration was not accidental. By aligning — directly or indirectly — with influential Islamist factions, Yunus expanded his political safety net. This may explain why Jamaat chief Shafiqur Rahman aggressively criticized Shahabuddin following the President’s revelations.
The intensity of that reaction suggests alignment of interests. When the President attacked Yunus’s governance, it was not Yunus but Islamist leadership that responded most sharply. That silence from Yunus, coupled with vocal defense from Islamist quarters, has fueled speculation about a mutually beneficial understanding.
Whether formal or informal, such alignment strengthened Yunus during a volatile transition. But it also shifted Bangladesh’s ideological center of gravity.
Calculated Politics, Not Coincidence
Political transitions often involve behind-the-scenes maneuvering. Yet, what distinguishes this episode is the sustained effort to diminish a sitting President’s authority.
From attempts to remove Shahabuddin to alleged restrictions on his movement, the pattern appears less reactive and more strategic. Neutralizing the presidency would eliminate a potential constitutional hurdle — especially if questions arose about the legitimacy of executive actions.
Furthermore, Shahabuddin claims he survived politically only because of backing from segments of the military and opposition leadership. That alone suggests he faced organized pressure.
If true, it reveals a dual-track strategy: consolidate executive power while managing alliances across political and ideological divides.
What It Means for Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s democratic institutions have historically faced strain during political transitions. But sidelining a President, even symbolically, risks normalizing executive overreach.
Yunus, a globally respected figure for his microfinance innovations, now faces criticism not for economic policy but for political centralization. His legacy, once rooted in social entrepreneurship, risks being overshadowed by allegations of power consolidation.
The larger concern is institutional erosion. When constitutional offices are weakened in moments of crisis, rebuilding trust becomes harder. And when political alliances blur ideological lines, public skepticism deepens.
Shahabuddin’s claims may never be fully adjudicated in a court of law. But politically, they have already reshaped the narrative. They have cast the interim period not merely as a caretaker phase, but as a power struggle defined by calculated moves and strategic alliances.
Whether Yunus acted out of necessity or ambition remains debated. What is clear, however, is that the presidency was not just sidelined — it became a battleground.
And in that battle, Bangladesh’s fragile constitutional equilibrium paid the price.
