Why Congress’s New Political Culture Mirrors Pakistan’s Downfall

Paromita Das

New Delhi, 4th December: Political decay rarely arrives with a warning. It creeps in through habits—habits of evasion, of moral grandstanding, of comforting illusions that excuse failure and postpone reform. For decades, Pakistan’s political establishment perfected this culture of denial and blame, a style of governance that fed its eventual institutional collapse. What is unsettling today is the quiet but unmistakable echo of that same mindset within the Congress party.

Congress’s “Pakistan Syndrome” is not merely about being sympathetic to Pakistan or soft on its aggression. It is something deeper and more dangerous: a steady internalisation of Pakistan’s own self-destructive political methods—appeasement dressed as diplomacy, victimhood replacing accountability, alliances substituting mass politics, and blame-shifting standing in for introspection. What emerges is a pattern that weakens Bharat’s national cohesion while keeping Congress trapped in a cycle of dependency and decline.

The Politics of Denial: A Habit Pakistan Perfected, Congress Imitates

In Pakistan’s political history, denial has been the preferred antidote to every crisis. Economic failures, terror accusations, international censure—every blow was softened through elaborate narratives blaming external conspiracies or internal enemies.

A similar reflex increasingly defines Congress’s political reactions. After electoral setbacks or public backlash, the party rarely interrogates its own decisions or leadership failures. Instead, explanations are outsourced to the same old tropes: institutions are biased, the media is compromised, voters are polarised, democracy is threatened. The language of victimhood becomes a convenient shelter, while genuine self-correction remains avoided.

This is precisely how institutions lose relevance. When politics becomes an exercise in locating enemies rather than examining weaknesses, the decline becomes structural—not circumstantial.

Soft Diplomacy and Strategic Timidity: A Legacy Repeating Itself

One of the most frequently cited cases of Bharat’s strategic indulgence was the Indus Waters Treaty (1960). Presented as a symbol of peace, it gave Pakistan control over the rivers that irrigate most of its farmland. Even during periods of terror attacks, infiltration, and military aggression, water continued to flow uninterrupted.

Critics argue this idealistic generosity, driven by political correctness rather than national security, revealed an instinct Congress still carries. Whenever aggression from Pakistan demanded firm diplomatic posture, Congress often appeared hesitant, preferring softer statements and moral balancing rather than clear condemnation.

This is not about military aggression or warmongering. It is about strategic clarity—something Congress has increasingly lacked. Pakistan’s establishment used soft rhetoric to mask hard failures; Congress uses the same vocabulary to soften political predicaments. In both cases, moral posturing substitutes for decisive action.

Organisational Erosion and the Politics of Borrowed Strength

Pakistan’s political parties deteriorated over time not merely due to corruption or military interference but because they stopped drawing legitimacy from their people. Coalitions, foreign alignment, and power-sharing bargains became the instruments of survival.

Congress shows the early signs of this same erosion. A once powerful mass movement has shrunk into an alliance-dependent coalition builder, relying on defectors, dynastic symbolism, or regional crutches to stay nationally relevant. Its organisational structures, once the envy of Asian politics, have grown brittle. Cadres are absent in many states, leadership remains insulated, internal debate is scarce, and ideological clarity has dissolved into reactive politics.

When a party’s survival hinges more on external alliances than on internal renewal, it signals the beginning of institutional fragility—precisely the weakness that crippled Pakistan’s democratic landscape.

Rhetoric Over Reform: The New Moral Theatre

Perhaps the most striking parallel is the shift from responsible opposition to moral theatrics. Whenever Pakistan’s establishment faced domestic crisis, it leaned heavily on emotional narratives—persecution, victimhood, nationalism under threat. These stories were strategically useful but institutionally destructive.

Congress has adopted a similar pattern. Defeats are not opportunities for renewal but occasions for melodramatic claims—democracy is dying, secularism is collapsing, institutions have surrendered. These alarms are rarely accompanied by concrete policy alternatives or internal reforms.

This sustained overuse of moral outrage may energise sympathisers briefly, but it erodes credibility. Over time, the public recognises the difference between genuine dissent and performance politics.

Why This Convergence Matters to Bharat

Pakistan did not fail overnight. It decayed through decades of evasion, rhetorical nationalism, institutional hollowing, and denial of internal dysfunction. The echoes in Congress’s behaviour should not be dismissed as partisan critique.

A weak, confused, rhetoric-driven opposition is dangerous for any democracy. When the principal opposition party relies on appeasement, identity politics, performative outrage, and alliances of convenience, it leaves the political system unbalanced. A strong government must be countered by a strong opposition—one with clarity, integrity, and a national vision.

Bharat’s challenges today—terrorism, water disputes, border instability, economic transformation—demand political maturity, not legacy entitlement or borrowed activism.

Bharat Has Outgrown Congress, but Congress Refuses to Outgrow Its Old Habits

Congress’s decline is not tragic—it is self-inflicted. It squandered historical goodwill through dynastic insulation, institutional manipulation, Emergency excesses, and decades of appeasement politics. It adopted Pakistan’s playbook of political survival long before the comparison became obvious: blame others, deny failures, retreat behind rhetoric, and cling to borrowed legitimacy.

Bharat’s rise—economic, strategic, civilizational—did not rely on Congress, and its future certainly doesn’t. If Congress continues on its present path, it will not harm Bharat; it will merely write its own obituary.

A Warning, Not an Equation

Equating Congress with Pakistan would be simplistic, but ignoring the structural similarities would be reckless. When a political organization copies the patterns that destroyed a neighbouring nation—denial, appeasement, dependency, emotional politics—it moves closer to irrelevance.

Bharat’s destiny is larger than any one party. Congress must confront its decay or concede its place in history. A party unwilling to reform itself becomes a relic. A nation unwilling to recognise that pattern risks inheriting its consequences.

Bharat will move forward. Whether Congress moves with it—or fades quietly into political memory—depends entirely on whether it can break free from its “Pakistan Syndrome.”