Poonam Sharma
Tarique Rahman does not arrive at Bangladesh’s prime ministerial office with the luxury of a reset. He walks in carrying memory — of exile, of political vendetta, of unfinished rivalries — and the weight of geography that refuses to be ignored. His landslide victory has restored competitive politics after 18 months of interim rule, but it has not cleared the chessboard. If anything, it has made the pieces more visible.
The son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and former President Ziaur Rahman, Rahman returns not merely as a party chief but as a political heir reclaiming legacy. Yet dynastic inheritance offers little protection against the structural realities he now confronts: a strained economy, restless youth, fragile institutions and a neighbourhood where miscalculation carries consequences.
The economy: mandate meets mathematics
Rahman has been careful in tone. He speaks of a “fragile economy” and weakened institutions — an implicit critique of Sheikh Hasina’s era without descending into vendetta rhetoric. Inflation hovering above 8 percent, unemployment affecting millions — many of them graduates — and a garment sector vulnerable to global tremors form the immediate pressure points.
Bangladesh’s growth story, built largely on ready-made garments, remittances and demographic momentum, now looks less assured. The garment industry remains the country’s lifeline, but its dependence on external demand and imported raw materials exposes structural weaknesses. Rahman’s proposed $10 billion social welfare programme may soothe short-term distress, particularly among unemployed youth and rural households. The question is sustainability. Welfare can cushion anger; it cannot substitute structural reform.
Nearly 40 percent of Bangladesh’s population is under 25. This is a demographic dividend only if jobs follow aspiration. The protests of 2024 demonstrated how quickly economic frustration can morph into political upheaval. Rahman must now convert that combustible energy into steady employment and investor confidence — a more delicate task than mobilising it on the streets.
The Siliguri shadow
If economics is the immediate fire, geography is the enduring one. India’s Siliguri Corridor — often called the “Chicken’s Neck” — is a narrow strip of land linking mainland India to its northeastern states. For New Delhi, stability in Dhaka is not an abstract diplomatic preference; it is a strategic necessity.
During the 2001–06 BNP-Jamaat government, Indian insurgent groups reportedly found shelter in Bangladesh. That chapter still shapes Indian strategic thinking. When Hasina later handed over northeastern insurgents, it cemented unprecedented security cooperation between the two countries. Trust, once built, is not easily discarded — nor easily restored if broken.
Rahman understands this inheritance. He has avoided overtly anti-India rhetoric since returning to Dhaka. Analysts in New Delhi privately suggest that a strong BNP majority may, paradoxically, be easier to engage than a fragile coalition dependent on hardline allies. But reassurance will not come from words. It will come from continued counterterror cooperation, border management and decisions on transit rights.
Transit is more than logistics. It symbolizes whether Bangladesh sees itself as a bridge or a buffer. Past BNP governments resisted granting India overland access to its northeast, invoking sovereignty. The Awami League reversed that approach, earning royalties and strengthening connectivity. Rahman’s stance here will quietly define his foreign policy posture.
Balancing India without leaning
Rahman has articulated an “economy-based foreign policy” under a “Bangladesh First” banner. It is a pragmatic formulation. It signals flexibility rather than ideological alignment. Yet Bangladesh’s balancing act is becoming sharper.
China remains a major investor and Bangladesh’s largest supplier of arms. Infrastructure projects along the Bay of Bengal tie Dhaka to Beijing through long-term financing arrangements that transcend political cycles. Pakistan, too, has revived defence contacts and trade ties, reopening historical corridors that were frozen for decades after 1971.
For Rahman, engagement with China is economically rational. Engagement with Pakistan carries symbolic weight within certain constituencies. But proximity to India is immutable. Geography compresses choice. India is Bangladesh’s largest neighbour, a key electricity supplier and an essential trade partner. Bilateral trade remains substantial, though tilted in India’s favour. Supply chains linking Indian inputs to Bangladeshi garment exports underline how intertwined the two economies have become.
Rahman’s challenge is to reassure Bharat — India — that Bangladesh will not become a platform for strategic encirclement, while simultaneously ensuring Dhaka is not perceived domestically as subordinate to New Delhi. This requires nuance: assert sovereignty without inviting suspicion; pursue Chinese investment without signalling strategic drift; maintain regional cooperation without inflaming nationalist sentiment.
Water, memory and politics
Beyond security and trade lies the emotive terrain of shared rivers. Fifty-four rivers cross the India–Bangladesh border. The Ganges Water Treaty expires in December 2026. The unresolved Teesta agreement continues to irritate public opinion in Bangladesh. Water disputes are technical on paper but deeply political in practice. In times of economic stress, they can become lightning rods.
If Rahman mishandles these negotiations, water could overshadow trade and security cooperation. If he manages them with patience and transparency, they could demonstrate a mature bilateral relationship.
The burden of expectation
Rahman’s premiership will be judged not by rhetoric but by sequencing. Can he stabilise inflation before welfare promises strain fiscal discipline? Can he revive investor confidence while reforming institutions weakened by political confrontation? Can he maintain internal order without reverting to heavy-handed tactics that erode democratic credibility?
Above all, can he craft a balanced foreign policy toward Bharat that protects Bangladesh’s sovereignty while recognizing interdependence? Balance does not mean equidistance; it means calibrated engagement based on interest, not impulse.
Bangladesh’s story has always been shaped by resilience — from liberation in 1971 to its economic rise in the 2000s. Rahman inherits both that resilience and its fragility. The Siliguri Corridor will remain narrow. The garment economy will remain exposed to global winds. Youth aspirations will remain impatient.
History has given him a mandate. Geography has given him constraints. Between them lies his test: to sweeten a bitter past not through slogans, but through steady, balanced statecraft.
