India–China’s Uneasy Rapprochement

Poonam Sharma 
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrived in New Delhi , the choreography was revealing. There was no red-carpet welcome, no over-the-top hospitality that India habitually retains for strategic partners. Instead, a muted protocol at Delhi airport signaled something deeper: India’s message was clear—“we will talk, but only on our terms.” This seemingly small diplomatic gesture reflected the underlying tension in India–China relations as both countries inch toward a possible reset while preparing for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s expected visit to Beijing for the upcoming SCO summit.

Under the surface, however, the geostrategic calculus is a lot more complicated than ceremonial optics. Two giants sharing one of the world’s most militarized borders, India and China, are now discreetly considering if cooperation, even limited, can be their long-term strategic interests in the face of altering global power equations.

Territorial Disputes

At the center of the discussion is the outstanding border. The Line of Actual Control (LAC), running along Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, is also disputed land. The Ladakh confrontations in 2020 left wounds too raw to mend soon, and yet Delhi talks indicate that Beijing is probing to see if territorial concessions—like Moscow’s stand in Crimea or Donbas—can be proposed in Asia.

Indian policymakers are sensitive to any implication that borders can be altered by aggression or bargaining. To accept such a principle would undermine India’s case in Kashmir and encourage China’s position on Arunachal. For New Delhi, to give way even on the principle of precedent is unthinkable. As one of its officials bluntly stated, “If we decide today that borders are open to negotiation, then tomorrow Kashmir is up for negotiation, and the next day Taiwan.” This is why India welcomed China’s overtures with suspicion.

South Block vs. South China Sea

The Indian establishment thinks China is linking its stance on the LAC to wider territorial talks elsewhere—Ukraine to the South China Sea. Just as Beijing covets concessions in sea disputes, it hopes to wear down Indian opposition with offers of “shared compromises.”

But Delhi’s calculation is sharper. India views any linkage of Ukraine, Crimea, or Taiwan with its Himalayan frontier as a trap. By rejecting even preliminary maps or drafts of such proposals, India is signaling it will not be drawn into Beijing’s framework of global territorial bargaining.

Economic Logic of Cooperation

In spite of mistrust, economics brings the two sides together. India and China represent 35% of world population and an enormous market potential. Chinese supply chains are still heavily integrated with Indian consumer markets and India’s emergence as a technology and services hub is a lure for Chinese investors.

New Delhi is reportedly weighing whether “compartmentalized cooperation” is feasible: economics divorced from geopolitics. The thinking is simple—why are trade, investment, and collaborative connectivity projects supposed to be hostage to unsettled differences? The suggestion of trans-Himalayan corridors, extended rail connectivity through Nathu La, and even cooperative research initiatives has made a comeback.

Still, skeptics argue that separating economics from strategy is unrealistic. As long as China builds military infrastructure across the LAC and supports Pakistan’s positions on Kashmir, India’s ability to trust Beijing remains minimal.

Modi’s Strategic Leverage

Prime Minister Modi is the prime actor. Beijing realizes that Modi is not only India’s leader but also the creator of its foreign policy vision long-term. Unlike his predecessors, Modi has been willing to employ both hard power and diplomatic bluffing.

China’s leadership sees Modi’s two-decade political durability as a guarantee of continuity. Thus, while Foreign Minister Jaishankar may handle day-to-day talks, Beijing believes any real breakthrough can only come through Modi himself. This explains why overtures from Beijing are increasingly framed as “offers only Modi can accept.”

The math in Beijing is that if Modi supports limited cooperation, it may establish a new Asian balance of power that marginalizes Washington’s primacy.

Russia, the U.S., and the Asian Chessboard this time

Another dimension shaping India–China dialogue is the Ukraine war and Russia’s precarious position. Moscow, once New Delhi’s most reliable partner, is now tied more closely to Beijing. India cannot ignore the fact that any large-scale settlement in Ukraine will indirectly empower China.

Meanwhile, the United States is pushing India to be tougher on Beijing. Washington desires India as a bulwark of its Indo-Pacific strategy of containment, with technology and defense ties as the payoff. But India’s policy is still “strategic autonomy.” New Delhi does not wish to get sucked into America’s zero-sum game against China.

The paradox is stark: Russia resorts to China, America nudges India, and India looks for a middle way. For Modi, here is a chance to bring India as an autonomous pole in world politics.

The Possibility of Joint Military Exercises

Arguably the biggest surprise in the discussion is that of Indian–Chinese joint military exercises. Although this is speculative, it is rooted in a question: are two enemies capable of still cooperating on certain fronts to contain security threats? Some believe that coordinated exercises would be a powerful message that Asia can sort out its conflicts independently without the intervention of the West. Others fear it would risk seriously undermining India’s credibility among Quad allies such as the U.S., Japan, and Australia.

Why This Moment Matters

The muted welcome at Delhi airport, the behind-the-scenes meetings in South Block, and Modi’s looming SCO summit appearance all add up to a larger reality: India and China are testing whether they can manage their rivalry without slipping into permanent hostility.

Neither is delusional about the presence of trust. Rather, developing is a pragmatic sense that Asia cannot tolerate two of its biggest economies mired in perpetual confrontation. For China reeling from slumping growth and pressure from the West, rapprochement with India may create new room. For India always suspicious of American overreach, modest cooperation with China provides a cushion.

Conclusion: A Delicate Balance

India–China relations are not friendly or openly hostile today but hang in suspended balance. Symbolic statements, such as disciplined protocol in Delhi, prove India’s assurance in dictating terms. However, structural factors—border disputes, China–Pakistan axis, and US pressure—ensure breakthroughs will be limited.

The next SCO summit will be the acid test. Whether Modi and Xi are able to find common ground on at least a framework for economic cooperation will perhaps signal the start of a tentative thaw. But if negotiations break down over issues of territory, the relationship will return to its comfortable rhythm of suspicion and confrontation.

For the time being, the world waits as Asia’s two giants struggle to write a new equation—one that has the potential to reshape the balance of power in the 21st century.