China’s Dam Dilemma

Poonam Sharma
It was not the world leader in dam building China is today in the mid-20th century. In 1950, at the end of decades of Japanese rule, the nation had only 22 dams — a small percentage of the 5,268 dams that existed around the world. Twenty years later, however, China’s ambitions for dam building took off. By 1973, it had built almost 70,000 dams, and by the start of the new millennium, Beijing turned its attention to mega-structures and giant reservoirs away from mere numbers.

Since 2000, China has doubled its reservoir storage capacity, adding over 470 billion cubic meters of water holding capacity. As of the end of 2020, the nation had a staggering 98,000 reservoirs with a cumulative storage capacity of 931 billion cubic meters. But only five years after that picture of water security and flood preparedness, the situation suddenly took a shocking turn for the worse.

A Shocking Decline

At the 2025 National People’s Congress, China’s Water Resources Minister reported shocking statistics. The nation had 94,877 dams — a net deficit of 3,689 since 2020. That’s about 4% of all of them. But the true shock came with another statistic: flood control storage capacity had dropped to only 5.6 billion cubic meters, half that of 2020.

This implies that though the nation lost just 4% of its dams, it lost 80% of its flood-control capability. One of China’s most senior hydrologists, Wang Weiru, now based in Germany, asked the question: How can a loss on such a grand scale be possible within so short a period?

Bigger Dams, Smaller Protection

In principle, the tendency to build fewer, but bigger, dams should not diminish flood control ability. Smaller, older dams may be replaced by new mega-structures, which typically hold more water. But that argument does not apply if those mega-dams are not actually controlled for flood prevention.

China’s dams have a range of functions — generating electricity, irrigation, navigation, tourism, and flood control. But in reality, most local governments favor economic gains over safety. Hydropower earnings, fish farming, and tourism tend to come first.

Management of floods calls for reservoirs to be lowered ahead of the rainy season so that they can fill up with incoming floodwaters. This lessens electricity generation and tourism revenues, though. Consequently, most local governments take a chance — maintaining reservoir levels high in anticipation of small rainfall amounts. When heavy rain occurs, there is no cushioning capacity, resulting in abrupt emergency releases that lead to flooding downstream.

Collapse on a Historic Scale

Officially, 3,689 dams vanished from China’s roster between 2020 and 2025. Many of these, experts say, were not intentionally decommissioned but fell apart from age, lack of maintenance, or shoddy construction. If that’s the case, it would equal a dam failure rate much greater than the nation’s long-term average.

1952-2021 — 67 years — China experienced 33,558 dam failures, at a rate of 52 per year and 5.3 per 10,000 dams. Losses over the last five years may be multiples of the earlier figure, indicating a water infrastructure crisis of structure.

China has a tragic record of dam failures. In August 1963, 319 dams ruptured in the Hai River Basin. A decade afterwards, over 550 dams ruptured in one year. The worst disaster occurred in August 1975 when the Banqiao Dam and 61 others ruptured in Henan Province, causing an estimated 240,000 deaths and displacing 11 million. The Discovery Channel afterwards graded this as the world’s most lethal man-made technological tragedy.

Man-Made Flooding in the Capital

During President Xi Jinping’s rule, unplanned emergency discharges from dams have become the norm, leading to extensive flooding nearly annually. This year’s catastrophic floods in Beijing demonstrate how mismanagement, rather than unusual weather, may lead to disaster.

The capital’s largest source of water, Miyun Reservoir, is supplied not just by the Chaobai and Bai Rivers but also by the huge South-to-North Water Diversion Project. This engineering marvel transports water from southern China to northern China using the height difference between Danjiangkou Reservoir (170 meters sea level) and Beijing (approximately 50 meters). Gravity makes water flow naturally into the capital.

But in a surprising turnabout, Chinese authorities have also constructed a 103-kilometer network of canals and pipes to pump this same diverted water uphill — 133 meters above Beijing — through nine high-capacity pumping stations. This energy-greedy and expensive turnaround begs the question about ultimate management goals.

Economic Benefits vs. Safety Hazards

The apparent downgrading of flood control in favor of economic exploitation reflects a broader governance issue. Hydropower profits are immediate and politically rewarding; flood prevention is a long-term safeguard that brings no quick returns.

But the price of neglect is huge. If trends persist, China may experience more frequent and deadly flood catastrophes, as climate change elevates rainfall events to intensities previously unknown. And unlike in the past, when the countryside paid the price, today’s risk extends to mega-cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing.

A Warning from History

China’s dam failures have already influenced global history. The 1975 Banqiao disaster was a warning against too much confidence in engineering and against politicized planning for infrastructure. Today’s sudden decline in flood control capacity could mean that the nation is once again forgetting those lessons.

Warning comes from hydrologist Wang Weiru: If dams are no longer operated for safety first, not only will they fail to shield China from floods but instead even boost the devastation when failure strikes.

The irony of a country with over 94,000 dams but diminishing flood protection is a stark warning that size and numbers are all for naught if not backed by responsible management. For a nation that spent decades creating an international reputation as a water-control superpower, the disparity between capacity on paper and security in practice may be the thin line between resiliency and disaster.