Poonam Sharma
In early 2024, Taiwan’s general election pitted a political and geopolitical tempest. Albeit the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secured an unprecedented third straight presidential term with Lai Ching-te (William Lai) heading the party, the party also lost its legislative majority. This division of power gave an unexpected boost to Beijing—and what has transpired ever since is perhaps one of the most underappreciated but profoundly troubling case studies of democratic subversion.
A Tenuous Majority Eroded
Taiwan’s 113-seat Legislative Yuan now resides in opposition “Blue Camp” control—led by the pro-Beijing Kuomintang (KMT) with 52 seats, assisted by centrist Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) with 8 seats. The ruling DPP is close behind at 51 seats. This paper-thin lead provided fertile ground for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to promote its united front strategy—one that is not aiming to invade, but implode Taiwan inwardly.
Shortly after the elections, a CCP guideline was issued that ordered its Taiwan Affairs Office and the United Front Work Department to call on local penetration networks to take over legislatively. Shortly thereafter, 17 Taiwan legislators, KMT and TPP members among them, went to mainland China for meetings with Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs chiefs—a rare gesture that left pro-democracy groups worried.
The Strategic Alliance and Beijing’s Quiet Coup
The KMT and TPP subsequently established a parliamentary bloc, electing a pro-Beijing-leaning speaker. Leverage their legislative majority to block important bills, such as the all-important national defense budget. They approved reforms that gave greater authority to the Legislative Yuan while subduing Taiwan’s executive branch, directly playing into Beijing’s hands.
As this self-sabotage played out, Taiwan’s pro-democracy base organized a “Great Recall Movement” against 31 KMT legislators. The concept was basic: if the DPP were able to win only six seats through recall and follow-up by-elections, it would once again control the entire executive and legislative branches.
The Recall Movement: Democratic Hope or Strategic Misfire?
By July 2025, the initial round of voting on 24 of the 31 KMT legislators occurred. With high voter turnout—some 4 million of the 6.7 million eligible voters—the recalls were unsuccessful across the board. No KMT legislator or targeted mayor was recalled.
Why was the movement unsuccessful?
Imbalanced Political Investment: The KMT machine was mobilized in full to fight the recalls, while the DPP, wary of being accused of orchestrating political revenge, sat on the sidelines.
Tactical Giveaways: The KMT legislated providing economic inducements such as pay raises for military and police and welfare benefits, winning over voters.
Strategic Overreach: Rather than focusing on a few infamous pro-Beijing legislators, the movement tried to remove almost 60% of KMT lawmakers. This repelled centrist voters and mobilized the KMT base.
Mismatch of Priorities: The recall movement was founded in concerns about national security. But KMT stronghold voters ranked local governance above geopolitics.
Hard to Win Territories: These were KMT fiefdoms, places where DPP volunteer strength simply could not match the KMT’s local organizational weight.
Underestimating CCP Penetration: Perhaps the most important mistake was underestimating the extent of the CCP’s united front machinery in Taiwan society and political apparatus.
The Consequences Were a Disaster for the DPP—and a Celebration for Beijing.
The CCP’s Next Move: Victor Gao’s Unnerving Strategy
Enter Victor Gao—a insider at the CCP, a Yale-educated former interpreter to Deng Xiaoping, now a VP at a Beijing think tank. In a chilling address given at a Chinese university on July 4th, Gao outlined Beijing’s actual strategy for reuniting with Taiwan—not by war, but by manipulation and subterfuge.
He proposed a “Second Xi’an Incident”—a historical reference to the 1936 moment when nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by his own generals and forced into an alliance with the Communists. Gao suggested a similar coup within Taiwan: seize a high-profile leader like President Lai Ching-te, issue emergency decrees under his name, and “invite” mainland security forces onto the island.
“This would not be a military campaign,” Gao explained. “It would be a stability mission. Our soldiers would wear security guard uniforms. It would be like an invitation.”
He even proposed to drug Lai on a visit to a doctor to get emergency decrees in advance, stating chillingly, “I could even write the decrees in advance.”
Espionage at the Highest Levels
Such threats are not fantasy. Taiwan has already witnessed dire instances of high-level espionage:
In February, a presidential aide called Wu Sheng was detained for leaking sensitive information to Beijing with the help of DPP staff.
Another aide, Mr. Shao, leaked China legislative documents for years while working for senior DPP legislators.
Former Foreign Minister Joseph Wu’s aide was revealed to be a Chinese spy.
In March, Taiwanese elite military and cyber warfare troops were sentenced for selling secret military information to the CCP.
These cases uncover a terrifying truth: Taiwan’s institutions have deep Chinese penetration by agents. More frightening, the laws on espionage are weak—most spies face charges of corruption only because leaked information is not officially classified.
What the West Should Learn
Taiwan’s failed recall attempt should be a wake-up call, not only for Taipei but also for Washington, Brussels, and Canberra. The CCP isn’t waiting for a war—it’s fighting a shadow war now. United front strategies, cyber warfare, economic coercion, and legal manipulation are all available to it.
Victor Gao’s “dentist analogy”—an anaesthesia-assisted knockout of Taiwan’s leaders followed by a decree proclamation of unification—wasn’t satire. It is a testament to the nightmarish ingenuity and hubris of the CCP’s hidden playbook.
The United States and allies need to act—not by making hollow statements, but by enhancing Taiwan’s institutional strength, cementing its cyber defenses, overhauling its espionage legislation, and assisting real democratic bottom-up movements.
The war for Taiwan will not be fought on the beaches. It is being fought today—in courtrooms, parliaments, hospitals, and corporate boardrooms. The only question now is not whether the CCP will attempt to take Taiwan.
It’s how far along they’ve already come.
