Bharat’s Stand on the Indus Waters Treaty: A New Doctrine of Justice and Deterrence

Paromita Das
New Delhi, 28th June:
The waters of the Indus have for long flowed silently through valleys scarred by conflict, largely untouched by the political chaos that often churns the region. But in the wake of repeated terrorist attacks, including the recent killing of 26 civilians in Kashmir, Bharat has drawn a line in those very waters. The government’s declaration that the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) will “never be restored” in its original form is not merely a statement on hydropolitics—it is a signal of a fundamental policy shift, one that seeks to align national security with sovereign water rights.

This moment, though grave, is not impulsive. It is a culmination of decades of frustration, violated goodwill, and misplaced optimism that water-sharing could remain immune to bullets and bombs.

The Treaty That Outlived Its Assumptions

Signed in 1960 under the World Bank’s mediation, the IWT was heralded as a triumph of diplomacy. Even during wars and prolonged stand-offs, the treaty remained sacrosanct. Bharat allowed over 80% of the Indus system’s waters—those of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—to flow into Pakistan, despite being the upper riparian. It did so under the assumption that water, as a shared lifeline, could foster peace or at least be insulated from hostility.

That assumption, today, lies shattered.

The concept that “water and blood cannot flow together,” as stated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, now resonates across Bharat’s political and civil discourse. It’s not a call to weaponize water irresponsibly, but a call to end the strategic absurdity of supplying a foundational resource to a nation that sponsors terror in return.

Not a Threat, But a Strategy

While there is no explicit clause in the IWT for unilateral withdrawal, neither is Bharat bound to ignore the persistent aggression it faces. International law may frown upon the disruption of natural water flows to downstream countries, especially when those flows are vital to agriculture and livelihoods. Yet, such frameworks also acknowledge the right of nations to defend themselves against existential threats. And state-sponsored terrorism—undeniably, repeatedly proven—is such a threat.

Simply abrogating the IWT or cutting water supplies would likely trigger international uproar. Pakistan has already hinted at taking the matter to global institutions. However, that need not trap Bharat in indecision. What is now required is a calculated recalibration—not an emotional rejection, but a strategic renegotiation.

Bharat can and should seek an official revision of the IWT’s terms, demanding the inclusion of provisions that allow for the suspension or abrogation of water-sharing obligations in cases of cross-border terrorism. By integrating national security into the treaty’s legal architecture, Bharat transforms the IWT into a living document—one that evolves with the geopolitical realities of the subcontinent.

Turning Water into Leverage, Not Weaponry

Water is not a weapon. But it is leverage. A revised treaty that explicitly links water-sharing to peace can serve as a powerful deterrent. It establishes that while Bharat respects international norms, it will not enable terrorism by maintaining outdated obligations. Such a clause would not only reduce Pakistan’s ability to play victim on global platforms, but also make clear that continued aggression has tangible, enforceable costs.

This approach also sets a precedent—anchoring the idea that in a rules-based global order, peace is the minimum prerequisite for privileges such as cross-border water-sharing. Bharat, in doing so, projects itself as a mature democracy that protects its citizens without flouting international responsibilities.

The Infrastructure Imperative

Diplomatic ambition must be matched with on-ground capability. Renegotiating the IWT means little if Bharat lacks the infrastructure to exercise control over its share of the Indus system. Accelerating the construction of storage dams, hydroelectric projects, and canal networks—especially in Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh—is now not just developmental but strategic.

This infrastructure doesn’t signal an intent to cut off Pakistan arbitrarily. Rather, it ensures that Bharat is equipped to manage and redirect its own waters as and when needed—legally, effectively, and with precision. These projects also support the broader aim of water security within Bharat, an increasingly urgent priority in an era of climate volatility.

A Treaty Rooted in Naïveté Needs Renewal by Realism

The original Indus Waters Treaty was born in a different world—where there was hope that diplomacy could rise above hostility, that rivers could transcend borders. But today’s world, marked by asymmetric warfare and ideologies that do not recognize mutual coexistence, demands a different calculus.

Bharat’s patience has been mistaken for weakness far too long. Rewriting the rules of engagement with Pakistan—through words, not war—may finally restore balance to a relationship defined by imbalance.

A Doctrine of Responsible Deterrence

Bharat’s refusal to restore the Indus Waters Treaty in its original form is not a declaration of hostility, but of principle. It is the assertion that national security must not be compromised for outdated ideals. It is the statement that peace has a price—and that price must be mutual respect.

By choosing a middle path—neither reckless withdrawal nor passive acceptance—Bharat is crafting a new doctrine. One that turns a Cold War-era accord into a modern instrument of deterrence and justice. One that upholds the right to defend without descending into aggression. One that ensures the rivers of Bharat carry not just water, but the will of a sovereign nation that has chosen strength over silence.