Bangladesh, Political Islam, and India’s Strategic Blind Spot
Poonam Sharma
India today faces the possibility of a multi-front security challenge—China on one axis, Pakistan on another, internal destabilisation within its borders, and a rapidly deteriorating situation in Bangladesh. Yet among these, Bangladesh remains the least understood and most underestimated front. This is not a sudden crisis; it is the outcome of long-standing ideological, historical, and geopolitical neglect.
If India wishes to avoid being pushed into a prolonged three-and-a-half-front confrontation, it must first confront a hard truth: Bangladesh is not merely a neighbouring country—it is an ideological battlefield.
The Forgotten Roots of Political Islam in Bangladesh
The assumption that Bangladesh is somehow ideologically softer or more secular than Pakistan is historically flawed. The roots of political Islam in Bangladesh run deeper than in Pakistan itself. The All-India Muslim League—the organisation that demanded Pakistan—was founded in Dhaka in 1905. Political Islam was not imported into Bangladesh later; it was nurtured there from the beginning.
The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 did not break this ideological continuity. Pakistan and Bangladesh may have separated geographically, but political Islam remained their common connective tissue. The events after independence illustrate this clearly.
In 1974, just three years after India helped liberate Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman invited Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for a state visit. Bhutto’s reception in Dhaka was notably warmer than that accorded to India’s President around the same time. The message was unmistakable: Islamic solidarity would ultimately outweigh gratitude or civilisational proximity with India.
Identity Shift After 1971: A Telling Reversal
Before independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman famously declared, “I am a human first, then a Bengali, and then a Muslim.” After independence, that hierarchy inverted. Religious identity moved to the front, reshaping state behaviour and political signalling.
This shift was not symbolic—it became structural. Over time, Bangladesh’s institutions, education system, and public life saw the expanding influence of Islamist organisations. Before 2008, madrasas in Dhaka were limited. Today, they exist in almost every locality, shaping a generation steeped not in linguistic nationalism but in religious absolutism.
Sheikh Hasina: Not an Ally, But a Temporary Buffer
Sheikh Hasina was never an ideal partner for India, nor did she fully protect Indian strategic interests. Yet it is equally undeniable that she acted as a partial buffer against total Islamist capture of the Bangladeshi state.
Her actions against jihadist groups were inconsistent—selective crackdowns, political compromises with organisations like Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh, and discriminatory handling of war-crimes trials related to 1971. Nevertheless, her presence delayed a complete ideological takeover.
That buffer collapsed due to external geopolitical intervention.
Western Regime-Change Playbook and Bangladesh
The United States and Western powers grew increasingly uncomfortable with Sheikh Hasina’s balancing act—deepening ties with India while simultaneously expanding economic engagement with China. From Washington’s perspective, Bangladesh under Hasina had become an obstacle in its broader Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China.The support extended by the US and Europe to radical elements in Bangladesh is evident—even to the extent of lowering flags at embassies for slain Islamist figures. India must decide: will it stand with Bangladeshi Hindus or with Islamist forces likely to form the next government?
What followed was a familiar script: destabilisation in the name of democracy, institutional erosion framed as reform, and eventually regime change. India—despite being Bangladesh’s closest neighbour—failed to anticipate or counter this shift.
History offers a grim pattern. Wherever such interventions occur, radical forces eventually fill the vacuum. Bangladesh is not an exception; it is the latest example.
Why Hindus Are the First Targets—and Not the Last
Once radical Islamist elements gain space, minorities become the easiest targets. In Bangladesh, Hindus were attacked first—because they are few, visible, and symbolically vulnerable. As their numbers decline, the violence does not stop. It turns inward, targeting the state itself, its history, its cultural heritage, and its national institutions.
Islamism is not a short-term political tactic; it is a long civilisational project that seeks to erase history and reshape collective memory. This is something India repeatedly underestimates—often hiding behind vague ideas of “composite culture” while ignoring historical patterns of persecution.
Partition, Nehruvian Idealism, and a Repeating Mistake
The insecurity of Hindus in East Pakistan was evident immediately after Independence. According to the 1941 Census, Hindus constituted nearly 28–29% of East Pakistan’s population. Sardar Patel suggested acquiring territory to create a secure homeland for them. That proposal was abandoned, largely due to Jawaharlal Nehru’s belief that goodwill and diplomacy would suffice.
The Nehru–Liaquat Pact that followed calmed domestic political pressure in India but failed to protect Hindus in Pakistan. The result was predictable: demographic collapse, displacement, and silence.
Today, India stands at a similar crossroads.
Citizenship, Civilisation, and Strategic Responsibility
India’s current citizenship framework, including the CAA, has proven inadequate in scale and implementation. Only a little over a thousand beneficiaries after years of enactment exposes the gap between intent and outcome.
India must think beyond incremental fixes. Israel’s Law of Return offers a civilisational model: a state that accepts responsibility for a persecuted people worldwide. Hindus following Sanatan traditions have only two civilisational homelands—India and Nepal. Nepal, too, is drifting under external pressures.
This is not merely a humanitarian question; it is a strategic necessity.
Bangladesh as the Next Major Challenge
Economic aid—water, electricity, trade—cannot resolve an ideological conflict. The challenge from Bangladesh is not transactional; it is doctrinal. As long as Indian policy treats it as a neighbourly misunderstanding rather than a civilisational confrontation, the crisis will deepen.
India must also reconsider its citizenship laws. Israel grants citizenship to Jews worldwide under the Law of Return. India should think beyond the current CAA framework and consider a law that grants citizenship to persecuted Hindus anywhere in the world, subject to security verification.
Christians and Muslims have dozens of countries. Sanatan-following Hindus have only India and Nepal—and Nepal too is drifting away. Yet, years after the CAA, only around 1,157 people have reportedly received citizenship. This is negligible. A law that doesn’t benefit its intended people is ineffective.
If India wants to avoid a three-and-a-half-front war, it must take firm and realistic steps on Bangladesh. Friendship gestures—water, power, trade—will not solve an ideological conflict. This is not an economic issue; it is a civilizational and ideological struggle between Islamism and Sanatan Dharma.
India should seriously consider creating a Hindu homeland zone around Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts, where Hindu populations still exist. If dialogue works, fine. If not, strength must be used—because Bangladesh knows it cannot confront India directly and will instead rely on proxy jihad and internal destabilization.
The support extended by the US and Europe to radical elements in Bangladesh is evident—even to the extent of lowering flags at embassies for slain Islamist figures. India must decide: will it stand with Bangladeshi Hindus or with Islamist forces likely to form the next government?
A significant portion of India’s diplomatic and bureaucratic class bears responsibility for this crisis. Many continue to argue for “waiting for elections” or “talking to the next government.” India has spoken to Pakistan for 79 years—with elected governments and dictators alike. Dialogue alone has solved nothing.
A permanent solution is required.
History must be remembered. The call for Direct Action Day was given in Calcutta on 16 August—a date still commemorated. That date was chosen deliberately, tied to Islamist symbolism. Our adversaries remember history. We choose to forget it.
If this amnesia continues, Bangladesh will soon become a bigger problem for India than Pakistan.
The growing alignment of Western powers with Islamist elements in Bangladesh, visible even in symbolic gestures, should serve as a warning. India must decide where it stands: with persecuted Hindus and long-term stability, or with short-term diplomatic comfort.History must be remembered. The call for Direct Action Day was given in Calcutta on 16 August—a date still commemorated. That date was chosen deliberately, tied to Islamist symbolism. Our adversaries remember history. We choose to forget it.
History remembers those who act—and punishes those who wait. If India continues to delay, Bangladesh may soon prove to be a greater strategic challenge than Pakistan itself.
