Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Gamble: From Washington to Islamabad

Paromita Das

New Delhi, 25th September: The killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 transformed Riyadh’s global image into one of suspicion and distrust. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) faced widespread condemnation, and then U.S. President Joe Biden vowed to hold him accountable. Yet, just a year later, Washington’s priorities began to shift. Confronted with China’s growing influence in the Middle East, the Biden administration recalibrated its stance and sought to court Riyadh instead of isolating it. What followed was a complex series of diplomatic maneuvers, broken promises, and strategic recalculations that ultimately culminated in Saudi Arabia pivoting toward a defense pact with Pakistan rather than with Washington.

From Isolation to Courtship

The Biden administration inherited a volatile regional architecture. Donald Trump’s Abraham Accords had already reset the Middle East’s diplomatic landscape by normalizing ties between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain. Biden needed something bigger. Saudi recognition of Israel would have been an undeniable game-changer—strengthening U.S. influence, curtailing Iranian leverage, and sidelining China in regional geopolitics.

During Biden’s 2022 visit to Riyadh, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman put his conditions on the table. He wanted nothing less than a NATO-like defense pact in exchange for recognizing Israel—a guarantee of military protection similar to U.S. alliances with Japan or South Korea. Washington explored alternatives, including designating Saudi Arabia as a non-NATO ally, hosting a naval base, and offering security assurances without requiring difficult Congressional approval. But Riyadh wanted cast-iron guarantees that it would be defended against threats like the 2019 Yemeni drone and missile strikes on its oil facilities.

For Biden, such a deal would have been a historic diplomatic win. For the Palestinians, it was unthinkable. Recognizing Israel without a serious path to their own state would effectively dismantle Arab solidarity in their cause. Washington tried to strike a balance in 2024, floating a three-part deal—U.S.-Saudi agreements, normalization with Israel, and a roadmap for Palestinian statehood. But Israel’s refusal to seriously discuss Palestinian sovereignty torpedoed the arrangement.

The Breaking Point

Saudi patience with U.S. ambiguity ran thin. While American troops were stationed in the Prince Sultan Air Base, Riyadh realized that they did not amount to a binding guarantee. The U.S. appeared increasingly hesitant to commit to an iron-clad defense pledge. Worse, Riyadh saw U.S. duplicity when Washington secretly backed Israeli strikes against Iran and even Qatar, a supposed American ally. Trust was broken.

With Europe unwilling to engage militarily, Russia distracted in Ukraine, and China acting as more of a mediator than a protector, Riyadh found itself without reliable guardianship. The search for security guarantees led MBS to Islamabad. If Washington would not commit, Pakistan at least could provide troops and a longstanding bond forged through financial aid, nuclear collaboration, and military cooperation.

Why Pakistan?

For decades, Saudi Arabia has financed Pakistan in moments of financial crisis, funded its nuclear program, and invited its troops to train and defend the kingdom. The $3.4 billion aid for nuclear development and repeated financial bailouts made Islamabad indebted to Riyadh. Pakistan’s army has frequently deployed in Saudi Arabia, reinforcing the personal and institutional linkages.

The newly signed defense deal is less about war-fighting outside the kingdom than about ensuring that Riyadh has loyal, battle-tested troops to secure its own borders and protect the monarchy from both external and internal threats. Pakistan, facing dire economic conditions, cannot afford to reject such a lifeline.

Critics argue that Saudi Arabia has effectively bought Pakistan’s military manpower—if not its nuclear assets—for use as mercenaries under Riyadh’s command. Unlike 2015, when Pakistan refused to join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, Islamabad’s options today are too limited to refuse.

The Bharatiya Angle

New Delhi has downplayed concerns about the Riyadh-Islamabad pact, describing it as the formalization of a long-standing arrangement. Bharat has little reason to expect Saudi intervention in a bilateral conflict with Pakistan. Riyadh has never engaged directly in conflicts beyond its region and is unlikely to jeopardize relations with Bharat, one of its largest trading partners. Bilateral trade between Bharat and Saudi Arabia touched nearly $43 billion in FY 2023-24, with Bharat standing as the kingdom’s second-largest trading partner.

At worst, the pact may embolden Pakistan militarily or funnel Saudi funding into its defense capabilities. Yet, the odds of Saudi Arabia deploying troops against Bharat remain minimal. For Riyadh, the pact is about securing its internal security architecture, not picking fights in South Asia.

A Strategic Gamble with Limits

For Saudi Arabia, pivoting toward Pakistan is not a sign of preference but of lack of choice. Islamabad offers manpower, loyalty, and nuclear symbolism but cannot provide what Riyadh ultimately wants: unquestionable defense guarantees against Iran, Israel, or any major threat. Only Washington can deliver that kind of shield.

For Pakistan, this pact is both an opportunity and a trap. While it secures financial inflows and entrenches military dependence, it also risks dragging the country into conflicts that have little to do with its own interests. It strengthens Islamabad’s ties with Riyadh but also underscores the transactional nature of that relationship.

In the end, Saudi Arabia’s defense pact with Pakistan is a stopgap—a pragmatic arrangement born out of U.S. hesitation and Riyadh’s security anxieties. The kingdom prefers Washington but must settle for Islamabad until American guarantees materialize. For Pakistan, the deal is a lifeline at a time of economic distress. For Bharat, the development is a matter to watch but not yet a strategic threat.

The agreement demonstrates the fluidity of alliances in the Middle East and South Asia. Security, in this volatile region, is no longer just about military power but about trust, credibility, and the willingness of great powers to commit. Until the U.S. restores that trust, Pakistan remains Saudi Arabia’s reluctant but necessary fallback.