Poonam Sharma
For weeks, the center of Beijing has been under the grip of a drama that few beyond China can witness, but that everyone is aware is playing out. Behind the guardedly closed doors of the Diet Club—the Communist Party’s innermost circle—China’s future is being dictated in hushed tones, backroom concessions, and military strategies.
At stake is nothing less than the fate of Xi Jinping himself. Will the man who concentrated more power in his hands than any Chinese leader since Mao now be forced to relinquish it? Or will he find a way to remain, even if only partially, as the final arbiter of China’s destiny?
The answer may decide not just Xi’s survival, but whether the Communist regime itself holds together.
Rumors, Half-Truths, and Strategic Leaks
Politics in Beijing is a world of factional intrigue, and truth is a luxury. Rumors circulate—some disinformation, some whispered in real fear—each crafted to influence opinion, gauge reactions, and build momentum.
Xi’s loyalists, still active despite his declining authority, have been the loudest. Their stories paint a picture of Xi regaining the upper hand, of plotting a comeback even if he steps aside from formal titles. Others, however, suggest Xi is fighting for his life, cornered by rivals who believe his fall is inevitable.
What is certain is that Xi’s official position—leader on the way out—has not shifted. The military is still divided, and party elders are at odds on whether ousting him will destroy the regime.
Xi has played this dilemma masterfully, threatening: “Oust me and the system collapses. Retain me, and you buy time to make the transition.” For a party fixated on survival, this is blackmail they cannot readily dismiss.
Four Factions, One Battlefield
The crisis today is like a four-way chess game in which no side can announce checkmate without assistance from the outside.
1. The Red Maoists
Xi Jinping’s die-hard leftist camp holds on to Mao-style authoritarianism: politics first, economy second, security first. They are dwindling in numbers as Xi grows weaker, but they are held together by fear. They also have political baggage in common with the last remnants of Jiang Zemin’s camp—corruption, repression, and human rights abuses. They constitute a “Leftist Princes’ Camp,” held together less by ideology than by self-interest.
2. The Reformists
Under Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua, this faction embodies something rare in Chinese politics—leaders who achieved prominence based on merit, not family connections. They call for drastic change: restore economic vigor, mend foreign relations, and relax political repression. Their strength has increased in the last several months, but they still fall short of a majority, thwarted by Maoists and party stalwarts. Their choice to succeed Xi: Wang Yang.
3. The “Save the Party” Pragmatists
Fronted by former president Hu Jintao, this group doesn’t seek bold reforms but rather stability. Their vision: undo Xi’s mistakes while preserving one-party rule. Hu’s protégé, Hu Chunhua, is their candidate for succession. In many ways, they echo Deng Xiaoping’s “economy first, politics later” pragmatism. For them, the key is not democratization but survival of the party’s face—and Xi’s negotiated exit.
4. The Military Hawks
The wild card. General Zhang Youxia and his protege Liu Yuan owe allegiance to no discernible ideological line. They desire one thing alone: Xi Jinping gone, utterly and totally, with no possibility of recall. Their struggle is existential and personal—if Xi lives, their careers, and potentially their lives, are finished. The military, guns in hand, is still the last judge of power.
The Coalitions Emerging
These groups are giving rise to two competing alliances.
The “Save the Party” Coalition: Xi Jinping teaming up with Hu Jintao pragmatists, willing to retire as Party General Secretary and State President but hold on to the military—just like Deng Xiaoping used to. Appealing to the desperate elders yearning for a peaceful transition.
The “Oust Xi” Coalition: The reformers and the military nationalists, the only thing they have in common is the resolve to strip Xi of all and any power. Anything less will not do.
At the heart of the battle is a single question: can Xi agree to a partial retirement, or is he going to be pulled out whole?
Hu Jintao’s Key Role
Ironically, the man who was once written off as the weakest leader in recent history might now possess the tipping hand. Hu Jintao’s image of conservatism—his immortal phrase was “Don’t rock the boat”—is now important.
If Hu sanctions a transition, it can be legitimized as a correction by a previous leader. If he does not, any attempt against Xi will potentially be a coup. For desperate party elders seeking to preserve the system, Hu’s inclusion could be the difference between order and chaos.
The Military Moves
But even Hu’s influence is dwarfed by the military’s. General Liu Yuan’s return to the scene at July’s PLA anniversary dinner told a story. Far from keeping low, he sat front and center—projecting confidence and power. His attendance at the same table as other retired generals long opposed to Xi suggested that the military faction is gearing up for the final confrontation.
Xi’s last gambit—keeping the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission—may already be collapsing. For generals like Zhang Youxia, allowing Xi to remain in uniform is unthinkable. This is life or death, and compromise is not an option.
Xi’s Last Summer?
As the Fourth Plenum looms in October, the countdown has begun. The September 3rd military parade may prove a symbolic occasion: if Xi delivers confidently, he might yet make it through the summer. Otherwise, rumors speak of his departure being sudden—ushered out not by minions, but by troops loyal to his opponents.
The result is not yet certain. But the Chinese political lesson has never varied: who gets to rule, and who vanishes, is determined by the faction that wields the gun.
For Xi Jinping, this summer could be his last as China’s unchallenged boss. The issue isn’t whether his hold has been weakened, but whether his rivals can attack in time—and whether China’s party can ride out the tempest that ensues.
