Revisiting the 1991 Military Transparency Agreement: A Strategic Liability for Bharat?

Paromita Das
New Delhi, 24th June:  In diplomacy, not all agreements age gracefully. One such pact—signed on April 6, 1991, between Bharat and Pakistan—was hailed as a pioneering confidence-building measure during an era when peace-building was the dominant political narrative. Known officially as the Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements, it sought to enhance transparency between the two nuclear-armed neighbors and reduce the chances of accidental conflict escalation.

Initiated under a Congress-supported regime, and possibly influenced by the “Aman Ki Asha” spirit of the time, the agreement reflected a genuine desire for de-escalation in a historically volatile region. However, over three decades later, that spirit now appears dangerously naïve. Today’s strategic environment, dominated by asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare, and terrorism, renders the 1991 agreement not just outdated—but potentially hazardous for Bharat.

Transparency vs. Operational Secrecy

The core premise of the 1991 agreement was transparency. Under its terms, both countries are required to notify each other 15 to 90 days in advance about large-scale military exercises or movements near their shared borders. While the principle of reducing surprise attacks seems sound on paper, in practice it significantly compromises Bharat’s operational secrecy.

In modern warfare, the element of surprise is a key strategic asset. Bharat’s obligation to disclose troop movements and large-scale exercises—even if conducted within its own territory—undermines its ability to simulate rapid deployment, test strategic responses, or conduct surprise readiness drills. Meanwhile, such disclosures offer Pakistan valuable intelligence on Bharat’s mobilization patterns, defensive posture, and logistical routines.

The Asymmetry Problem

What makes the agreement particularly skewed is the assumption that both parties will comply equally. Bharat has largely abided by the framework, true to its image as a rules-based democracy. Pakistan, however, has repeatedly demonstrated that it views such agreements as tools of convenience rather than binding commitments.

History offers grim evidence. The Kargil intrusion of 1999 was a blatant violation of both the Line of Control and the spirit of the 1991 agreement. Pakistan used the cover of routine logistics to push in infiltrators and troops without any prior notice. Similarly, it has engaged in forward deployments, unauthorized skirmishes, and cross-border firing—often during supposedly peaceful periods.

Even worse, Pakistan leverages non-state actors and proxy militants—Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and others—as strategic tools to wage war without officially mobilizing its army. These acts go unaddressed in the current framework, exposing a critical gap in the agreement’s scope.

Outdated in the Era of Hybrid Warfare

One of the most glaring flaws in the 1991 pact is its outdated focus on conventional military engagements. The battlefield has evolved. Modern-day conflict includes psychological operations, disinformation campaigns, cyber warfare, and most alarmingly, proxy terrorism—all tools frequently employed by Pakistan’s deep state.

While Bharat is compelled to reveal the positioning of its armed forces near the border, Pakistan faces no comparable obligation to disclose plans for a terror infiltration or an ISI-backed sub-conventional operation. This discrepancy not only undermines the agreement’s relevance but makes it a strategic liability.

Was Bharat Forced Into Signing?

It’s important to understand the context of the early 1990s. Bharat, at the time, was reeling under severe economic distress, seeking IMF support, and striving for improved global and regional diplomacy. With the Cold War just concluded, non-alignment gave way to cautious engagement. In this environment, Bharat’s leadership likely viewed the agreement as a low-cost gesture to build regional trust.

Yet such decisions—however well-meaning—must be judged by their long-term impact. Unfortunately, while the agreement might have helped Bharat’s international image, it did little to enhance its actual security. Over the years, Pakistan has exploited Bharat’s compliance while engaging in repeated acts of bad faith.

Time to Review or Withdraw

Agreements built on mutual transparency demand mutual trust. In the case of the 1991 military notification pact, that trust has been repeatedly violated by Pakistan’s duplicity. In today’s security landscape—marred by incidents like Pulwama, Uri, and the perpetual threat of cross-border terror—such one-sided commitments no longer serve Bharat’s interests.

Rather than clinging to outdated CBMs that yield strategic disadvantage, Bharat must consider renegotiation or withdrawal. Any future framework should include:

• Provisions covering proxy warfare and hybrid threats.
• Verification mechanisms to prevent deceit.
• Reciprocity as a non-negotiable condition.
• Provisions for suspending the agreement during hostile actions or ceasefire violations.

Transparency without trust is not confidence-building—it’s risk amplification.

A Diplomatic Relic That Needs Rethinking

The 1991 agreement may have once symbolized a hopeful step toward peace, but in today’s context, it has become a strategic hindrance. Bharat, a regional power facing a complex spectrum of threats, must not allow historical diplomacy to jeopardize contemporary security.

It’s time to shift from symbolic agreements to pragmatic deterrence. Agreements must evolve with threats—and if they don’t, they must be discarded. The Bharat of 2025 must not be shackled by the diplomatic naiveté of 1991.