On June 1, 2025, Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web obliterated over 40 Russian strategic aircraft, including nuclear-capable Tu-95MS Bear and Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers, across five airbases. The attack, executed with 117 low-cost first-person view (FPV) drones, exposed a glaring vulnerability: Russia’s bombers were parked in the open, defenseless against Ukraine’s precision strikes. This weakness, partly rooted in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), mirrors global practices in the United States, NATO, and India, where bombers are similarly exposed. Operation Spider Web not only humiliated Moscow but set a precedent for drone warfare, with lessons amplified by India’s Operation Sindoor, which countered Pakistani drone attacks after a deadly terrorist strike.
Why Fighter Jets and Bombers Are Stored Differently
Fighter jets, such as the U.S. F-35, NATO’s Eurofighter Typhoon, or India’s Su-30 MKI, are often housed in hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) at airbases near conflict zones. These reinforced concrete structures shield smaller aircraft from missile or bomb attacks, ensuring combat readiness. For instance, India’s Ambala airbase uses HAS for Rafale jets, and NATO’s Ramstein base (Germany) protects F-16s similarly. In contrast, strategic bombers like Russia’s Tu-95, the U.S. B-52H, or Tu-160 are typically parked on open tarmacs. Their massive size—wingspans over 50 meters—requires costly, large hangars that many nations, including Russia, forego due to budget constraints. Open storage also supports rapid deployment for nuclear deterrence or long-range missions, as seen at U.S. bases like Minot or Russia’s Belaya airbase.
New START Treaty and Open Storage
The New START Treaty (2010, extended to 2026) shapes U.S. and Russian bomber storage. Limiting each to 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, including heavy bombers, the treaty relies on transparency via satellite-based National Technical Means (NTM) and 18 annual inspections. Open parking ensures visibility of nuclear-capable bombers like the Tu-95 and B-52, reducing mistrust over hidden arming. While not explicitly required, open storage aligns with treaty norms. Russia’s suspension of inspections in 2023 loosened compliance, but open storage persisted, likely due to habit and economic limitations, leaving bombers vulnerable to Ukraine’s drones.
Global Practices: U.S., NATO, and India
The U.S. parks B-52s and B-1Bs openly at bases like Barksdale, visible during 2025’s Exercise Prairie Vigilance. B-2 stealth bombers occasionally use hangars for secrecy, but cost restricts widespread sheltering. NATO’s U.S.-provided bombers at RAF Fairford (UK) follow suit, with B-52s exposed during 2025 deployments. India, lacking strategic bombers, uses Su-30 MKI and Rafale jets for quasi-strategic roles, often parked openly at bases like Lohegaon due to budget and operational needs, though some border bases have limited shelters. These practices mirror Russia’s, exposing aircraft to drone threats.
Why Drones Evade Radar
Operation Spider Web’s success hinged on FPV drones’ stealth. Their small radar cross-section (<0.1 m²), low-altitude flight (<100 meters), and non-metallic bodies make them nearly invisible to radars designed for larger threats. Russia’s defenses at Olenya failed against drones launched from nearby trucks. Electronic jamming, disrupting drone control signals, is the primary countermeasure. India’s Operation Sindoor, launched May 7, 2025, after Pakistan-backed terrorists killed 26 tourists in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, demonstrated this. Indian forces used electronic warfare to neutralize Pakistani drones of Chinese and Turkish provenance, which targeted 15 Indian cities, including Srinagar and Pathankot. The S-400 system and jamming rendered these drones inoperable. 
Why Russia’s Planes Were Sitting Ducks
Russia’s bombers were exposed due to New START’s transparency, economic constraints, and strategic missteps. Open storage complied with treaty verification, but Russia’s failure to build hangars—unlike limited efforts for smaller aircraft at Marinovka—left assets unprotected. Bases like Belaya, assumed safe 4,300 km from Ukraine, lacked robust defenses. Makeshift tire coverings on Tu-95s proved futile. Ukraine’s covert drone deployment via trucks turned these bases into easy targets, causing $7 billion in damage with $47,000 worth of drones.
Operation Spider Web: A New Precedent
Operation Spider Web marks a shift toward asymmetric warfare. Ukraine’s 117 drones, costing $400 each, crippled 34% of Russia’s strategic missile carriers, showcasing low-cost drones’ superiority over high-cost bombers ($200 million per Tu-95). Ukraine’s 2.2 million drones in 2024 signal a future where cheap, AI-enhanced systems dominate. This echoes India’s Operation Sindoor, where precise strikes on nine terror camps in Pakistan and PoK showed drones’ strategic impact. Warfare may pivot from expensive platforms to disposable drone swarms, as posts on X suggest.
Lessons for India
India’s open storage of Su-30s and Rafales risks similar vulnerabilities, especially against China’s drone capabilities. Operation Sindoor’s success with jamming highlights:
Hardened Shelters: Build HAS at bases like Ambala to protect jets.
Anti-Drone Defenses: Expand S-400 and electronic warfare systems to counter Chinese/Turkish drones.
Drone Investment: Accelerate DRDO’s low-cost drone programs like Ghatak.
Base Security: Enhance surveillance to prevent covert drone staging.
Operation Spider Web and Sindoor signal a drone-driven future, urging India to fortify airbases and adopt asymmetric tactics to avoid Russia’s fate.
