Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion on Timelines : How Feasible It Is

Poonam Sharma
In a seminal constitutional moment, the Supreme Court has returned a unanimous advisory opinion to clarify whether the judiciary had the authority to issue time-bound directives on the President or state governors when they act on bills passed by state legislatures. The reference under Article 143 of the Constitution had sought clarity after a previous judgment by a two-judge bench in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Governor of Tamil Nadu attempted to set explicit deadlines for governors and even invoked Article 142 to offer deemed assent to delayed bills. The Supreme Court has now categorically rejected those judicial directions as unconstitutional, yet simultaneously clarified that governors cannot indefinitely sit on bills. This nuanced stance reshapes an ongoing debate over constitutional responsibility, federal balance, and the separation of powers.

The Court’s Core Finding: No Timelines on Governor or President

Central to the advisory opinion is the following clear holding of the Court:

The judiciary cannot prescribe fixed timelines for the President or governors under Articles 200 and 201.

Such directions, the Court held, would intrude into the domain of the executive and disturb the constitutional architecture. Articles 200 and 201, detailing the assent process for state bills, grant discretionary space to constitutional heads. Imposing deadlines would amount to rewriting the Constitution—a role the judiciary does not possess.

This pronouncement overturns the April 8 two-judge ruling, which had fixed:

1-month limit for governors to act on state bills

3-month limit for bills needing presidential consideration

Use of Article 142 to grant “deemed assent” to 10 Tamil Nadu bills

The Court has now clarified that these directions were beyond judicial authority, reinforcing the basic rule that constitutional roles cannot be judicially restructured through pragmatic shortcuts.

No Deadlines, Yet No Infinite Delay: A Subtle Balance

While discarding timelines, the Court also declined to adopt the opposite extreme—that governors may withhold action indefinitely. It underscored the point that constitutional functionaries such as the governor cannot become bottlenecks in the federal structure.

The Court emphasized:

Governors cannot afford to be obstructionist.

They must dialogue with the elected government at the state level. Cooperative federalism in India is about mutual respect, not passive resistance.

This is an intervention of some significance. It is premised on a legitimate political issue. Governors in a few states have recently been accused of delaying bills for months, with seriously debilitating consequences for administration and causing political brinkmanship. While the Court could not stipulate timelines, it invoked constitutional morality and democratic ethics to remind the governors about their duties.

Why the Court Declined to Impose Timelines

The feasibility of judicial timelines is institutionally limited for several reasons:

1. Constitutional Structure Protects Discretion

The Constitution has intentionally created a system where the President and governors are constitutional umpires, rather than mere transactional signatories. The imposition of strict deadlines would undermine the discretion inbuilt into Articles 200–201.

2. Concerns Over Judicial Overreach

If the judiciary could dictate timelines for one constitutional function, it could set a precedent to encroach into executive or legislative prerogatives in other areas. The Court avoided this slippery slope.

3. Asymmetry in Federalism

In India’s federal system, the Centre and states are weighted differently. A uniform judicial timeline might upset this asymmetry, and operational difficulties could arise when there are genuine, complex constitutional questions that require time.

4. Separation of Powers

Ultimately, the Court opted for institutional restraint. It eschewed finding a solution that would blur boundaries among the constitutional organs.

How Feasible Is the Court’s Proposed Model?

While the Court refused timelines, it laid out a scheme anchored on dialogue, accountability, and co-operative federalism. This latter principle is viable in real terms, only if certain attendant pre-conditions exist.

1. Political Will

The Court’s moral expectation-“governors must engage in constructive dialogue”-will work only if the Union government and governors consciously adopt a non-partisan approach. This is difficult but not impossible in politically polarized states.

2. Constitutional Conventions

Stable democracies rely as much on conventions as on written rules. If India strengthens conventions around timely assent, much of the friction will naturally reduce. The Court’s opinion encourages this evolution without imposing rigid mandates.

3. Transparency in Governor–State Interactions

Where governors make their objections to bills known in a timely fashion and in writing, governments can respond, revise, or defend their legislation. This minimizes ambiguity and delay.

4. Judicial Backstop Without Deadlines

While the Court cannot prescribe timelines, it certainly has the authority to find constitutional mala fides.

The courts would have good grounds for intervening on the basis of constitutional breakdown or arbitrary action against a governor who demonstrably delays assent in order to frustrate democratic processes.

5. Political Costs of Delays

Governors consistently delaying bills could henceforth face scrutiny by the public, criticism from the media, and political pressure. The Court’s opinion empowers democratic institutions to hold governors accountable without judicial micromanagement.

A Middle Path for a Complex Democracy

The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court attempts to stabilise the delicate constitutional balance of India. It rejects all extreme solutions- neither judicial rewriting of timelines nor unrestricted executive delay. It reiterates the spirit of the Constitution, exhorting: Conversation, not confrontation Institutional cooperation over power tussles Federal respect over political expediency This middle path may not immediately end political deadlocks, but it reinforces constitutional boundaries while nudging institutions toward cooperative behaviour. In the long term, this balanced approach is both feasible and essential for the health of India’s parliamentary democracy.