Maxar’s Open-Market Model: US Selling to Both Sides ,How Maxar’s Satellite Imagery May Be Empowering Pakistan’s Terror Network

Poonam Sharma

In an era of precision warfare, satellite imagery is both a sword and a scalpel. But what if the same sword falls into the hands of both the healer and the killer?

India’s newest military action—Operation Sindoor, initiated on May 7, 2025, after the Pahalgam terror attack killed 26 civilians—demonstrated India’s increased capability to execute precise strikes against terror bases in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Terrorist command centers in Bahawalpur and Muridke, located in heavily populated areas, were hit with precision.

What made this possible? A mix of sovereign observation and commercial satellite imagery, led by Maxar Technologies, an American company whose satellites have resolutions as high as 30 centimeters—high enough to identify individual cars, entrances, or trenches.

But here’s the twist: Maxar sells the same imagery to India and Pakistan.
And that’s where the battlefield becomes complicated.

Double-Edged Data: When Satellites Don’t Pick Sides

Though Maxar services global clients—such as militaries, spy agencies, and commercial allies—it operates on an open-access commercial model. Under this model, satellite data can be had by the highest bidder irrespective of geopolitical fallout.

In Pakistan’s case, this access is facilitated by Business Systems International (BSI), a Maxar reseller with a lengthy and contentious history. Led by Obaidullah Syed, a man convicted in 2022 of illicitly exporting sensitive U.S. technology to Pakistan’s nuclear program, BSI is far from an impartial intermediary.

This is not all about past misdeeds. Recent events show a disturbing trend. Defence sources have disclosed a sudden spike in satellite tasking over Pahalgam weeks prior to the April 22 attack, some uncomfortable questions being: Was commercial imagery seized upon by hostile forces to chart Indian weaknesses?

The Indian government directly accused Pakistan’s ISI and military of planning the attack. If such planning was facilitated by US-origin satellite imagery, the implications are deadly.

India’s Satellite Gap: The Strategic Vulnerability

India does have its own spy assets such as Cartosat-3, but even with its touted capabilities, actual performance is restricted to about 50-centimeter resolution—a big step down from Maxar’s acuity.

More importantly, Cartosat-3 goes it alone. That is, it can’t return to the same area often, a major disadvantage during high-speed security scenarios.

As one defence official explained, “India doesn’t have a sub-50 cm constellation for daily revisit capabilities. That’s why we rely on commercial players like Maxar and Airbus.”

And there’s the irony: India is paying for satellite intelligence that Pakistan may be using too—perhaps against India.

Aiding Terror by Proxy?

BSI’s connections raise further red flags. It has worked with Pakistan’s strategic agencies, including the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)—a designated threat entity under U.S. law. Past cases also link Rawalpindi-based shell firms to illegal procurement of sensitive American technology for Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs.

Given this murky ecosystem, Maxar’s “equal-access” policy is not just ethically questionable—it’s geopolitically reckless.

At a recent Delhi Defence space Conference, Maxar officials were questioned about their collaborations in Pakistan. Their rationale? They sell imagery to “all U.S. allies.” But this platonic evenhandedness unravels when pressed.

“You can’t presume neutrality selling key information to state sponsors of terror,” contended one Indian defence researcher. “Pakistan and India are not peers when it comes to regional stability or democratic values.”

Time for India to Push Back

India is not helpless. Being a principal consumer of satellite data, India can—and should—use its economic and strategic weight.

India can push the US government to clamp down on sales of commercial imagery to nations with known terror ties. And there is already a precedent. In March 2025, the Trump administration’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) cut off Ukraine’s access to Maxar data, based on changing priorities. If the US could shut out Ukraine—a current war ally—then India can certainly request restrictions on Pakistan’s terror-linked players.

“India needs to force the US to halt Maxar from indirectly arming its adversaries,” added an expert in space policy based in Delhi. “Allowing Maxar to provide information to ISI-connected companies while terming India as a strategic partner is not merely hypocrisy—it’s a security threat.”

Finally, the episode highlights India’s urgent need to invest in indigenous satellite constellations with high resolution and rapid revisit times. Dependence on foreign suppliers opens up a vital weak point in the event of war or crisis.

The next war will be fought in the skies—not with fighter planes, but with pixels. And if the pixels get into the wrong hands, the harm is no less lethal.

Let’s be blunt: In 21st-century shadow wars, data is ammunition.
India has to make sure it’s not unknowingly feeding the opposite side’s guns.