India should review its maritime capabilities and regulations now that PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean is rising steadily

*Paromita Das

Indians who were alarmed by recent photos showing Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy ships in ports in the Indian Ocean, like Hambantota and Djibouti, would have been overjoyed to learn that on August 15, nine Indian Navy (IN) warships were in seven ports around the world—one on each continent—to hoist the Tricolor on the 75th anniversary of our independence. The navies of both nations were conveying a single, nuanced message.

Unlike land and air power, maritime power has a variety of functions to perform that are just as significant as the things it does during conflict. Given their portability, adaptability, and sustainability, warships can be positioned almost anywhere in the world’s oceans, even in another country’s territorial waters and harbors, without violating that country’s sovereignty. The ship’s mere presence could serve political purposes by sending out signals of coercion, intimidation, friendship, and assurance. All over the world, navies fight, frequently in vain, to persuade their political overlords of the value of their use as potent “instruments of state power”. Examining the PLAN’s success in this situation is worthwhile.

The shocking news that the PLAN had surpassed the US Navy, with its strength of 293 ships, and its battle force of 350 ships and submarines, was revealed by the US Department of Defense in September 2020. The PLAN did not develop overnight and continues to be the most obvious illustration of China’s political leadership’s overarching strategic vision.

A friendly USSR gave the PLAN equipment, advisors, and doctrine upon its official establishment in 1950. The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 was a major setback for the PLAN. But it also turned out to be a blessing in disguise because the Chinese leadership started a national project to reverse-engineer Soviet weapons. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and the selection of General Liu Huaqing as PLAN commander in 1982 were the key factors in the PLAN’s transformation from a minor coastal force to a significant blue-water navy.

When the 2004 defense white paper outlined the PLAN’s duties as “safeguarding China’s maritime security and maintaining its sovereignty of its seas,” political indications of a “maritime awakening” began to emerge. China watchers were caught off guard when general-secretary Hu Jintao said that China wanted to become “a maritime Great Power” at the 2012 Party Congress. A year later, Xi Jinping clarified the justification by listing China’s maritime goals as: defense of the homeland against a seaward attack by the US; protection of its seaborne energy and trade, traffic; and recovery of national territory of Taiwan.

China’s political leadership was obviously astute enough to understand that developing a full set of technological, industrial, and human resource capabilities was necessary to becoming a “maritime power.” They went about establishing the elements that have made China a true maritime power with resoluteness and method.

China is a global leader in seabed exploration, has the biggest Coast Guard in the world, and one of the best deep-water fishing fleets in the world.

The IN gradually acquired hardware and capabilities in all three dimensions of maritime warfare, enjoying a smoother birth and fewer growth pains. Today’s maritime force is considered to be up to “NATO standard” and is compact but highly professional and effective thanks to visionary naval leadership. The security elite of India, however, is unaware that a “fighting navy” is only one component of a country’s maritime strength and that without the other elements, India cannot claim to be a “maritime power.”

A significant opportunity has been lost as a result of India’s failure to give maritime capacity-building its full attention. A much-needed industrial base for India’s naval power would have been established through the steady development of the maritime industry. Additionally, it would have given a boost to ancillary and heavy industries, helped our youth develop their skills, and created thousands of job opportunities.

Sino-Indian tensions are likely to last given the current Chinese intransigence and our misunderstanding of their expansionist intentions. China benefits militarily from keeping the fighting contained to the Himalayan Mountains because this “continental fixation” keeps India confined to a South Asian box.

In this context, it is important to keep in mind that the Indian Ocean sea lanes are China’s jugular vein, through which a vast majority of its trade, energy, raw materials, and finished goods are transported by merchant shipping. We must be ready to take advantage of this vulnerability if necessary, because any disruption of seaborne traffic will have an impact on China’s industry, economy, and political stability. By the same reasoning, we must be ready for a steady increase in PLAN activity in the Indian Ocean and ports. In light of this, now would be a good time for India to review both its maritime strategy and its capabilities.